Billie Buymon Newsom, Richard McKean Newsom, Stacy Newsom Klien, Teddy Maurine Newsom, Ted Newsom v. Gold Cross Service Inc., Gold Cross Ambulance, and Gold Cross Ambulance Service: Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Billie Buymon Newsom, Richard McKean
Newsom, Stacy Newsom Klien, Teddy Maurine
Newsom, Ted Newsom v. Gold Cross Service Inc.,
Gold Cross Ambulance, and Gold Cross
Ambulance Service: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nelson L. Hayes, Lloyd A. Hardcastle; Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson; attorneys for
respondents.
James W. McConkie, Randall Bunnell; attorneys for appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Newsom v. Gold Cross Service, No. 880051 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/844
UTAH COURT OF APPE 
BRIEF 
UTV-' 
D:- . .r 
50 
DOCKET KoZW^-CA , 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BILLIE BUYMON NEWSOM, 
RICHARD McKEAN NEWSOM, STACY 
NEWSOM KLIEN, TEDDY MAURINE 
NEWSOM, and ROBERT NEWSOM, 
as heirs of the estate of 
TED NEWSOM, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
GOLD CROSS SERVICE, INC., 
dba GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE and 
GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE SERVICE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
Court Of Appeals No. 880051-CA 
Argumerit Priority 
Classification: 14b 
Appeal from a final order of Judge John Rokich, Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, a(fter trial by jury 
of a wrongful death action. 
Nelson L. Hayes 
Lloyd A. Hardcastle 
Attorneys for Respondents 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 












MCKEOWN & MCCONKIE 
200 South, Suite 300 
City, Utah 84102 
363-5511 
5 1988 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BILLIE BUYMON NEWSOM, 
RICHARD MCKEAN NEWSOM, STACY 
NEWSOM KLIEN, TEDDY MAURINE 
NEWSOM, and ROBERT NEWSOM, 
as heirs of the estate of 
TED NEWSOM, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v* 
GOLD CROSS SERVICE, INC., 
dba GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE and 
GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE SERVICE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
Court of Appeals No. 880051-CA 
Argument Priority 
Classification: 14b 
Appeal from a final order of Judge John Rokich, Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, after trial by jury 
of a wrongful death action. 
Nelson L. Hayes 
Lloyd A. Hardcastle 
Attorneys for Respondents 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
(801) 531-1777 
James W. McConkie 
Randall Bunnell 
Attorneys for Appellants 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 363-5511 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities • 3 
Statement Showing Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals........3 
Statement Showing Nature of the Proceedings 4 
Statement of the Issues • 4 
Statement of the Case .4-8 
Summary of the Argument 8 
Detail of the Argument. .9-15 
Conclusion and Relief Sought 15-16 
Addendum (Jury Instruction #20) 17 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Brown v, Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970)... 14-15 
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cinncinati, Inc., 
27 Ohio St.2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971) 9 
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puqet Sound, 
99 Wash.2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) 10 
Hiser v. Randoff, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (1980) 9 
James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Calif., 
1980) 10-11 
Jeanes v. Miller, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir., 1970) ....10 
Kallenbera v. Beth Israel Hospital, 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 
N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), afffd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 374 
N.Y.S.2d 615, 337 N.E. 2d 128 (1975) 10 
King, Joseph H., Jr., "Causation, Valuation,. and Chance 
in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting 
Conditions and Future Consequences," 90 Yale L.J., 
1353 (1981) 11-13 
Waffen v. U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1986) 10, 13 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal was originally taken to the Supreme Court of 
Utah pursuant to the authority granted in Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for review of a judgment entered against 
the Appellants after trial by jury. Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court of Utah poured-over this case to t^ he Court of Appeals for 
disposition. 
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STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment entered against the Appel-
lants by the Third Judicial District Court after trial by jury of 
their wrongful death action. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court com-
mitted reversible error by giving jury instruction No. 20 
(addendum p. 17). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellants, heirs of decedent Ted Newsom, brought a 
wrongful death cause of action against the Respondent, Gold Cross 
Service, Inc., a business in Salt Lake County which operates an 
ambulance service. The Appellants alleged that Gold Cross 
Ambulance and its employees were negligent in failing to dispatch 
in a timely manner an ambulance which had been requested after 
Ted Newsom became ill and subsequently died shortly thereafter. 
The Appellants alleged that had the ambulance arrived in a timely 




COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial of the case commenced on September 8, 1987 and 
lasted until September 14, 1987. The Honorable John Rokich, 
District Judge, submitted his instructions to the jury, including 
instruction No. 20 (R.498). The Appellants made an exception to 
Jury Instruction No. 20 (T. 159) . The jury returned a special 
verdict finding that the Respondent, Gold Cross Services, was 
negligent as alleged by the Appellants. The jury further found 
that the negligence on the part of the Respondent was not a 
proximate cause of the death of Ted Newsom (R.597-598). 
III. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Judge Rokich entered judgment on the verdict on November 9, 
1987 ordering that the Appellants be awarded no money damages and 
that the action be dismissed on the merits. (R.627-628) 
IV. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 3, 1984, Ted Newsom was at the Sugar Street Cafe in 
Midvale, Utah and fell after becoming ill. Immediately there-
after, a call from the Sugar Street Cafe was made to 911 Emer-
gency Services. The 911 Emergency Services transferred the call 
to the Salt Lake City 911 fire department dispatcher. At 4:00 
p.m. on the same date, the fire dispatcher contacted the Gold 
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Cross ambulance dispatcher (R.126). Between 4:00 p.m. and 4:05 
p.m., the Gold Cross dispatcher paged its nearest ambulance to 
the Sugar Street Cafe four different times. The Gold Cross 
dispatcher stated that the nearest Gold Cross Ambulance was not 
answering the page (R.128). At 4:05 p.m., the Gold Cross 
dispatcher dispatched a second ambulance to the Sugar Street 
Cafe. Upon dispatching the second ambulance, the Gold Cross 
ambulance dispatcher discontinued trying to contact the nearest 
ambulance. At 4:10 p.m., the Midvale police dispatcher cancelled 
the Gold Cross ambulance because a Midvale ambulance was en-
route (R.129). Between 4:17 p.m. and 6:18 p.m., the Midvale 
ambulance arrived at the Sugar Street Cafe. At 4:39 p.m., the 
Midvale ambulance transported the deceased to Cottonwood Hospital 
(R.130). Had the Gold Cross dispatcher been able to contact the 
nearest Gold Cross ambulance promptly, the ambulance could have 
arrived at the Sugar Street Cafe within approximately three 
minutes without lights and sirens. It would have taken the Gold 
Cross ambulance approximately five to six minutes to travel from 
the Sugar Street Cafe to Cottonwood Hospital (R.137). 
At trial, the Appellants called Dr. Frank Yanowitz, M.D., 
cardiologist, to testify on their behalf. Dr. Yanowitz was 
presented with a hypothetical question which assumed facts 
substantiated by evidence presented by the Appellants at trial 
(T.9-13). Based upon the hypothetical, Dr. Yanowitz concluded 
6 
that had the Gold Cross Ambulance arrived at the Sugar Street 
Cafe prior to 4:13 p.m., with appropriate medical equipment, Mr. 
Newsom would have had at least a 70% to 80% chance of survival 
(T.12-13). On cross examination, the Respondent presented Dr. 
Yanowitz with an alternative hypothetical based upon evidence 
presented by the Respondent during trial. Dr. Yanowitz gave his 
opinion that given the facts as presented by the Respondent, Mr. 
Ted Newsom would have had less than a 50% chance of survival. 
(T.36-38) I 
The Respondents called Dr. John Parry, M.D., a cardiologist 
who testified that in a hospital where there are infinite 
resources and the best of everything, the prognosis would have 
been poor for Ted Newsom and that he probably had less than a 5% 
chance of survival, (T.54-56). On cross examination, Dr. Parry 
was asked to assume the Appellant's version of the facts and Dr. 
Parry admitted that certain medical equipment on board of the 
Gold Cross ambulance would have been medically helpful in respect 
to Ted Newsom's condition (T.72). The Respondents also called 
Dr. Jeff Clausen, M.D., a specialist in emergency medicine, who 
testified on direct examination that even if Ted Newsom would 
have received appropriate medical care, his chances of survival 
would have been minimal (T.131). Dr. Clausen testified that Ted 
Newsom had a 9% probability of survival (T.135-136). 
The trial court's jury instruction No. 20, with which the 
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Appellants took an exception, states as follows: 
The plaintiffs are not entitled to recover against the 
defendants merely by showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that such defendants failed to conform to the 
standard of care elsewhere defined in these instruc-
tions. The plaintiffs must also prove, by a preponder-
ance of expert medical testimony, that the death of Ted 
Newsom, of which the plaintiffs complain, probably 
would not have occurred if such defendant had conformed 
to the standard of care. In this connection, it is not 
enough for the plaintiffs to have shown that the result 
might have been different, or that there is a possibil-
ity that the result would have been different, had the 
defendant conformed to the standard of care. 
In other words, unless the plaintiffs have proven, by a 
preponderance of the expert medical testimony, that the 
result probably would have been different if the 
defendant had conformed to the standard of care, as 
defined in these instructions, then the plaintiffs have 
not proved that any injury or loss sustained by them 
was proximately caused the conduct of the defendant. 
(R.498, Addendum p. 17) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The erroneous instruction precluded the jury from awarding 
damages upon a finding of a lost chance of survival of less than 
50%. Some jurisdictions accept the rule as enunciated in the 
erroneous instruction, whereas other jurisdictions have accepted 
variations of an alternative rule that full recovery can be made 
even if the possibility of survival is less than 50%. The better 
reasoned view, accepted by the Supreme Court of Utah, is that 
recovery can be made even where the lost chance is less than 50%, 
and that it is the prerogative of the jury to place a value on 
the lost chance. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is whether a wrongful death recovery 
for damages can be made where negligence on the part of the 
defendant has resulted in a loss of chance of survival of less 
than 50% on the part of the decedent. 
The jurisdictions considering this issue have taken three 
different approaches. The first approach is the same approach 
used by the trial court in the instant case. Where medical 
malpractice has resulted in a loss of chance of survival, the 
defendant has the burden of proving that had proper treatment 
been rendered, the decedent probably would have survived. In 
other words, probability is defined as that which is more likely 
than not or greater than 50%. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of 
Cinncinati. 27 Ohio St.2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971). In this 
approach, a mere loss of an unspecified increment of the chance 
for survival is insufficient to meet the standard of probability. 
Hiser v. Randoff, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (1980). 
In the second approach, the plaintiff does not have the 
burden of proving that the decedent's chance of survival was more 
probable than not, or greater than 50%; the plaintiff need only 
show that there would have been a substantial possibility of 
survival had the proper medical treatment been rendered. The 
lost chance cannot be so insubstantial as to amount to sheer 
speculation, but the chance of survival does not need to have 
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been 51% or more before it was reduced. Waffen v. U. S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. , 1986). 
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 
Wash.2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983), the court, taking the above 
approach, held that recovery could be made where the decedent's 
chance of survival was reduced from 30% to 25% because of medical 
malpractice, reasoning as follows: 
To decide otherwise would be a blanket release from 
liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was 
less than a 50% chance of survival, regardless of how 
flagrant the negligence. (99 Wash.2d 609,611, 664 P.2d 
474,477) 
In Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital. 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 
N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615, 337 
N.E.2d 128 (1975), the decedent was denied a 20% to 40% chance of 
survival because of medical malpractice and the court allowed 
recovery. In Jeanes v. Miller, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970), the 
court held that Plaintiff could recover where medical malpractice 
had lessened the decedents 35% chance of survival. 
The third approach, accepted by at least one jurisdiction, 
allows recovery for loss of chance of survival no matter how 
small. James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Calif., 
1980) . In James, the court indicates that existing authority 
requires, at a minimum, that defendant actually destroy a 
"substantial possibility of survival," but the facts of the case 
seem to indicate that the court in practice has allowed a more 
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relaxed standard. In this case, plaintiffs apparently failed to 
sustain their burden of proof that a tumor was operable at a 
given time which was a condition precedent to finding that the 
decedent had a 10% to 15% chance of surviving five years. 
However, the court held that plaintiff's failure to establish the 
premise for the loss of a statistically measurable chance of 
survival does not prevent recovery. The court concluded that a 
plaintiff may be compensated for any aggravation of his injury or 
shortening of his life span proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence, even though other factors contributed to or caused 
the initial condition. 
In all three of the above approaches, all provable damages 
are generally recoverable if the burden of proof has been met by 
the plaintiff. Thus, in the first approach, if the decedent was 
denied a 60% chance of survival, the plaintiff would be entitled 
to receive 100% of his damages. Inj the second and third 
approach, if the decedent was denied a 30% chance of recovery, 
the plaintiff would nevertheless be entitled to 100% of his 
damages. Professor Joseph H. King, Jr., in his law review 
article entitled "Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal 
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Conse-
quences," 90 Yale L.J., 1353 (1981), has criticized the 
approaches used by courts in loss of chance cases. He indicates 
that the better reasoned approach is a follows: 
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Causation has for the most part been treated as an all 
or nothing proposition. Either a loss was caused by 
the defendant or was not.... (A) plaintiff ordinarily 
should be required to prove by the applicable standard 
of proof that the defendant caused the loss in ques-
tion. What causes a loss, however, should be a 
separate question from what the nature and extent of 
the loss are. This distinction seems to have alluded 
the courts, with the result that lost chances in many 
respects are compensated either as certainties or not 
at all. 
To illustrate, consider the case in which a doctor 
negligently fails to diagnose a patient's cancerous 
condition until is has become inoperable. Assume 
further that even with a timely diagnosis the patient 
would have had only a 30% chance of recovering from the 
disease and surviving over the long term. There are 
two ways of handing such a case. Under the traditional 
approach, this loss of a not-better-than-even chance of 
recovering from the cancer would not be compensable 
because it did not appear more likely than not that the 
patient would have survived with proper care. Recover-
able damages, if any, would depend on the extent to 
which it appeared that cancer killed the patient sooner 
than it would have with timely diagnosis and treatment, 
and on the extent to which the delay in diagnosis 
aggravated the patient's condition, such as by causing 
additional pain. A more rational approach, however, 
would allow recpvery for the loss of the chance of cure 
even though the chance was not better than even. The 
probability of long term survival would be reflected in 
the amount of damages awarded for the loss of the 
chance. While the plaintiff here could not prove a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a cure 
by the defendant's negligence, he could show by a 
preponderance that he was deprived of a 30% chance of a 
cure. (90 Yale L.J. at 1363-64) (Emphasis added in 
article) 
Further reasoning by Professor King reveals that the all-or-
nothing approach cannot be defended. The first reason is because 
of the patently arbitrary nature of the approach. It seems arbi-
trary to deny recovery to a victim denied a 49% chance of 
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recovery as opposed to a victim denied a 51% chance of recovery. 
Furthermore, the all-or-nothing approach is obviously at odds 
with the basic rationale of the tort system which is designed to 
deter wrongful conduct. The all-or-nothing approach will have no 
incentive to medical practitioners to render proper care where 
the chance of survival would be less than 50% in the first place. 
In addition, the patent injustice of the all-or-nothing approach 
will create distortions and legal fictions in respect to rules 
surrounding causation and damages. (Yale L.J. at 1376-78) 
The court in Waffen, supra, obviously approved of much of 
Professor King's approach. The court, citing with obvious 
approval the language used in Professor King's illustration, 
states as follows: 
...In analyzing problems of this nature, it is better 
to consider the loss of a substantial chance of 
survival as a different type of loss with a different 
measure of damages than the loss of life, instead of 
treating the former as a variation on the burden of 
proving causation in a claim for negligently causing 
the patient's death. The destroyed chance itself is 
the compensable loss. (799 F.2d 911,919) 
Unfortunately, the court was not able to accept completely the 
more rational approach and continued to insist upon a "substan-
tial possibility" standard. Even a "substantial possibility" 
standard would be at odds with Professor King's more rational 
approach and would be subject to the same criticisms of arbitra-
riness and possible distortion of the tort system. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has already adopted the better 
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reasoned approach as early as 1970 in a factual context which is 
not substantially different than the factual context of the 
instant case. In Brown v. Johnson. 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 
(1970), the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and 
sustained bodily injury. At trial, a doctor testified that the 
plaintiff had a 15% chance of requiring surgery in the future. 
The defendants assigned error to the trial court for refusing to 
instruct the jury that nothing could be awarded for possible 
surgery. The defendants apparently thought that unless the 
plaintiff had over a 50% chance of having surgery, no award could 
be made. The court rejected the defendant's argument and stated 
as follows: 
In order to recover damages for any injury or harm, the 
plaintiff must convince the jury by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the injury has been or will be 
sustained. This does not mean that the chances of 
sustaining the harm must be over 50%. It means that 
the jury must be convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there is a definite risk of harm, and 
when so convinced, the jury will evaluate the risk. 
Here the preponderance of the evidence was to the 
effect that 15 out of each 100 people in the condition 
of the plaintiff would positively require future 
surgery. There is nothing speculative about it. The 
percentage is certain. The value to placed upon the 
percentage is for the jury to determine. If the law 
were as Defendant hoped it is and there were 100 cases 
like the instant one, the jury would know that 15 of 
the plaintiffs would surely require the surgery and be 
entitled to recover therefore, yet none of them could 
recover because no one plaintiff could convince the 
jury that he himself had more than a 50% chance of 
requiring the surgery. This reasoning would give an 
undeserved advantage to the wrongdoing defendant. (24 
Utah 2d 388,392, 472 P.2d 942,945) 
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In light of Brown, it is apparent that the Supreme Court of 
Utah has long ago adopted the better reasoned approach. The 
Supreme Court has been able to make the critical distinction 
referred to by Professor King which has alluded other courts. 
The Supreme Court has separated the question of causation of a 
loss from the nature and extent of the loss. Although the 
factual context involves a percentage possibility of future 
surgery, the principles enunciated therein are equally applicable 
to the factual context involved where a chance of survival by the 
decedent has been lost because of medical malpractice. In Brown. 
the plaintiff had a small chance of requiring future surgery and 
this injury was compensable, with the jury to determine the value 
to be placed upon the chance of future surgery. In a case 
involving a small loss of chance of survival because of negli-
gence, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly allow recovery for the 
loss of chance, with the jury to determine the value of the lost 
chance. These two factual contexts are nothing more than two 
sides of the same coin. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
In light of Brown, the trial court's jury instruction No. 20 
in the instant case was contrary to Utah Law. There was evidence 
presented at trial upon which the jury could have found that Ted 
Newsom had less than a 50% chance of survival which was removed 
because of Respondent's negligence. However, jury instruction 
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No. 20 precluded the jury from awarding appropriate damages. 
The Appellants respectfully request the Court of Appeals to 
reverse the Order of the District Court and remand for a new 
trial on the issue of proximate cause and damages. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1988. 
<dkMXtL^ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -A 
The plaintiffs are not entitled to recover against the 
defendants merely by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that such defendant failed to conform to the standard of care 
elsewhere defined in these instructions. The plaintiffs must 
also prove, by a preponderance of expert medical testimony, that 
the death of Ted Newsom, of which the plaintiffs complain, 
probably would not have occurred if such defendant had conformed 
to the standard of care. In this connection, it is not enough 
for the plaintiffs to have shown that the result might have been 
different, or that there is a possibility that the result would 
have been different, had the defendant conformed to the standard 
of care. 
In other words, unless the plaintiffs have proved, by a 
preponderance of the expert medical testimony, that the result 
probably would have been different if the defendant had conformed 
to the standard of care, as defined in these instructions, then 
the plaintiffs have not proved that any injury or loss sustained 
by them was proximately caused the conduct of the defendant. 
ADDENDUM 
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